In Defense of H.O.T. Theory: A Second Reply to Adams and Shreve

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Abstract
In Gennaro (2016), I had originally replied to Fred Adams and Charlotte Shreve’s (2016) paper entitled “What Can Synesthesia Teach Us About Higher Order Theories of Consciousness?,” previously published in Symposion. I argued that H.O.T. theory does have the resources to account for synesthesia and the specific worries that they advance in their paper, such as the relationship between concepts and experience and the ability to handle instances of ‘pop-out’ experiences. They counter-reply in Adams and Shreve (2017) and also raise further objections to H.O.T. theory which go well beyond the scope of their 2016 paper. In this paper, I offer additional replies to the points they raise in Adams and Shreve (2017).
Reprint years
2017
ISBN(s)
1584-174X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GENIDO-3
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-06-07
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References found in this work BETA
Consciousness Explained.Lycan, William G. & Dennett, Daniel C.
Critique of Pure Reason.Kant, Immanuel & Smith, Norman Kemp
Consciousness and Mind.Rosenthal, David

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2017-12-02

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