In Defense of H.O.T. Theory: A Second Reply to Adams and Shreve

Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):231-239 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In Gennaro (2016), I had originally replied to Fred Adams and Charlotte Shreve’s (2016) paper entitled “What Can Synesthesia Teach Us About Higher Order Theories of Consciousness?,” previously published in Symposion. I argued that H.O.T. theory does have the resources to account for synesthesia and the specific worries that they advance in their paper, such as the relationship between concepts and experience and the ability to handle instances of ‘pop-out’ experiences. They counter-reply in Adams and Shreve (2017) and also raise further objections to H.O.T. theory which go well beyond the scope of their 2016 paper. In this paper, I offer additional replies to the points they raise in Adams and Shreve (2017).

Author's Profile

Rocco J. Gennaro
University of Southern Indiana

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-12-02

Downloads
237 (#61,439)

6 months
54 (#71,749)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?