Salient Alternatives and Epistemic Injustice in Folk Epistemology

In Archer Sophie (ed.), Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. Routledge. pp. 213-233 (2022)
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Abstract
I consider a number of questions for foundational epistemology that arise from further reflection on salience of alternatives and epistemic position. On this basis, I turn to more applied issues. First, I will consider work in social psychology to motivate the working-hypothesis that social stereotypes will make some alternatives more, and some less, salient. A related working-hypothesis is that social stereotypes may lead to both overestimation and underestimation of a subject’s epistemic position. If these working-hypotheses are true, the outcome may be a distinctive route to epistemic injustice.
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