The New Evil Demon and the Devil in the Details

In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 102-122 (2018)
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I will argue that cases of massive deception, such as New Evil Demon cases, as well as one-off cases of local deception present challenges to views according to which epistemic reasons, epistemic warrant, epistemic rationality or epistemic norms are factive. In doing so, I will argue is that proponents of a factive turn in epistemology should observe important distinctions between what are often simply referred to as ‘bad cases.’ Recognizing epistemologically significant differences between deception cases raises serious challenges for those who deny a central role for non-factive aspects of epistemology.

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Mikkel Gerken
University of Southern Denmark


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