Biological Parenthood: Gestational, Not Genetic

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):225-240 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Common sense morality and legislations around the world ascribe normative relevance to biological connections between parents and children. Procreators who meet a modest standard of parental competence are believed to have a right to rear the children they brought into the world. I explore various attempts to justify this belief and find most of these attempts lacking. I distinguish between two kinds of biological connections between parents and children: the genetic link and the gestational link. I argue that the second can better justify a right to rear.

Author's Profile

Anca Gheaus
Central European University

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-07-09

Downloads
956 (#13,259)

6 months
149 (#20,938)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?