Biological Parenthood: Gestational, Not Genetic

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):225-240 (2018)
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Abstract
Common sense morality and legislations around the world ascribe normative relevance to biological connections between parents and children. Procreators who meet a modest standard of parental competence are believed to have a right to rear the children they brought into the world. I explore various attempts to justify this belief and find most of these attempts lacking. I distinguish between two kinds of biological connections between parents and children: the genetic link and the gestational link. I argue that the second can better justify a right to rear.
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2017, 2018
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Archival date: 2017-07-09
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2017-07-09

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