The Right to Parent and Duties Concerning Future Generations

Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (1):487-508 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Several philosophers argue that individuals have an interest-protecting right to parent; specifically, the interest is in rearing children whom one can parent adequately. If such a right exists it can provide a solution to scepticism about duties of justice concerning distant future generations and bypass the challenge provided by the non-identity problem. Current children - whose identity is independent from environment-affecting decisions of current adults - will have, in due course, a right to parent. Adequate parenting requires resources. We owe duties of justice to current children, including the satisfaction of their interest-protecting rights; therefore we owe them the conditions for rearing children adequately in the future. But to engage in permissible parenting they, too, will need sufficient resources to ensure their own children's future ability to bring up children under adequate conditions. Because this reasoning goes on ad infinitum it entails that each generation of adults owes its contemporary generation of children at least those resources that are necessary for sustaining human life indefinitely at an adequate level of wellbeing.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GHETRT-2
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-12-07
Latest version: 2 (2016-07-10)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2015-12-07

Total views
508 ( #8,132 of 51,479 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
48 ( #11,509 of 51,479 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.