You gotta do what you gotta do

Noûs 43 (1):157-177 (2009)
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Abstract
One question about the role of the mental in the determination of practical reason concerns the pro-attitudes: can any set of beliefs, without the help of a desire, rationalize or make reasonable a desire, intention, attempt, or intentional action? After criticizing Michael Smith’s argument for a negative answer to this question, I present two arguments in favor of a positive answer. Another question about the role of the mental in the determination of practical reason concerns belief: what gives you a reason to go to the store, the fact that you’re out of milk or the belief that you’re out of milk? The two questions about the mental are connected. I argue that if we give a positive answer to the first question and reject the Humean Theory of Motivation, we cannot accept the currently favored conception of normative reasons as determined by the facts. For the anti-Humean, normative reasons must be determined by the agent’s perspective.
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Archival date: 2018-11-02
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References found in this work BETA
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
Practical Reality.Dancy, Jonathan

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The Normativity of Rationality.Kiesewetter, Benjamin

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2009-02-05

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