I—Meaning, Understanding and Normativity
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146 (2012)
Abstract
I defend the normativity of meaning against recent objections by arguing for a new interpretation of the ‘ought’ relevant to meaning. Both critics and defenders of the normativity thesis have understood statements about how an expression ought to be used as either prescriptive or semantic. I propose an alternative view of the ‘ought’ as conveying the primitively normative attitudes speakers must adopt towards their uses if they are to use the expression with understanding.
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Archival date: 2013-07-27
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2012-05-16
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2012-05-16
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1,110 ( #3,191 of 55,937 )
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73 ( #9,295 of 55,937 )
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