Inner Awareness: The Argument from Attention

Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
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Abstract

We present a new argument in favor of the Awareness Principle, the principle that one is always aware of one’s concurrent conscious states. Informally, the argument is this: 1) Your conscious states are such that you can attend to them without undertaking any action beyond mere shift of attention; but 2) You cannot come to attend to something without undertaking any action beyond mere shift of attention unless you are already aware of that thing; so, 3) Your conscious states are such that you are aware of them. We open by introducing more fully the Awareness Principle (§1) and explicating the crucial notion of “mere shift of attention” (§2). We then develop the argument more fully, first in an intuitive form (§3) and then more formally (§4), before replying to a series of objections (§§5-7).

Author Profiles

Anna Giustina
Universitat de Valencia
Uriah Kriegel
Rice University

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