Essentialist Explanation
Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2871-2889 (2017)
Abstract
Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in metaphysical explanation, and philosophers have fixed on the notion of ground as the conceptual tool with which such explanation should be investigated. I will argue that this focus on ground is myopic and that some metaphysical explanations that involve the essences of things cannot be understood in terms of ground. Such ‘essentialist’ explanation is of interest, not only for its ubiquity in philosophy, but for its being in a sense an ultimate form of explanation. I give an account of the sense in which such explanation is ultimate and support it by defending what I call the inessentiality of essence. I close by suggesting that this principle is the key to understanding why essentialist explanations can seem so satisfying.
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Archival date: 2018-06-02
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2016-11-11
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487 ( #14,999 of 69,074 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
70 ( #10,878 of 69,074 )
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