Causal foundationalism, physical causation, and difference-making

Synthese 190 (6):1017-1037 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
An influential tradition in the philosophy of causation has it that all token causal facts are, or are reducible to, facts about difference-making. Challenges to this tradition have typically focused on pre-emption cases, in which a cause apparently fails to make a difference to its effect. However, a novel challenge to the difference-making approach has recently been issued by Alyssa Ney. Ney defends causal foundationalism, which she characterizes as the thesis that facts about difference-making depend upon facts about physical causation. She takes this to imply that causation is not fundamentally a matter of difference-making. In this paper, I defend the difference-making approach against Ney’s argument. I also offer some positive reasons for thinking, pace Ney, that causation is fundamentally a matter of difference-making
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GLYCFP
Upload history
Archival date: 2013-05-08
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-12-21

Total views
440 ( #10,995 of 54,352 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #39,625 of 54,352 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.