Unsharp Humean Chances in Statistical Physics: A Reply to Beisbart

In M. C. Galavotti (ed.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 531-542 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In an illuminating article, Claus Beisbart argues that the recently-popular thesis that the probabilities of statistical mechanics (SM) are Best System chances runs into a serious obstacle: there is no one axiomatization of SM that is robustly best, as judged by the theoretical virtues of simplicity, strength, and fit. Beisbart takes this 'no clear winner' result to imply that the probabilities yielded by the competing axiomatizations simply fail to count as Best System chances. In this reply, we express sympathy for the 'no clear winner' thesis. However, we argue that an importantly different moral should be drawn from this. We contend that the implication for Humean chances is not that there are no SM chances, but rather that SM chances fail to be sharp
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Reprint years
2013, 2014
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GLYUHC
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-02-27
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-11-10

Total views
158 ( #28,699 of 54,643 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #40,058 of 54,643 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.