Reduction in real life

In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press (2008)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The main message of the paper is that there is a disconnect between what many philosophers of mind think of as the scientific practice of reductive or reductionist explanation, and what the most relevant scientific work is actually like. I will sketch what I see as a better view, drawing on various ideas in recent philosophy of science. I then import these ideas into the philosophy of mind, to see what difference they make.1 At the end of the paper I address a possible objection: the familiar package of ideas I reject in the philosophy of science should not be lightly discarded, because other popular views on fundamental issues depend on positions that I want to reject. I reply that those apparently attractive further ideas are not worth holding onto
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-11-05
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
34 ( #58,886 of 2,448,358 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #56,010 of 2,448,358 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.