Purposeful Explanation and Causal Gaps

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):141--155 (2013)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that a commitment to science and the methodo- logical commitment to causal closure do not require a rejection of the idea that the choices of souls explain the occurrence of certain events in the physical world. Stated slightly differently, I maintain that one can both affirm science and believe that souls causally interfere in the course of events in the physical world. Such an affirmation and belief are compatible. In short, science vis-à-vis the methodological principle of causal closure poses no problem for souls as explanatory agents.

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