Essentialist modal rationalism

Synthese:1-9 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
In my recent book Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, I proposed a principle linking rational coherence and metaphysical possibility, as part of an argument against physicalism. Although it was not the focus of concern in this book, I had hoped that that principle might undergird a generalised account of our knowledge of modality. I have subsequently realised, however, that that principle has limited application, in a way that conflicts with these broader ambitions. In this paper I will outline these limitations and propose ways of overcoming them. The result I hope, is the bare bones of an account of how our knowledge of metaphysical modality is grounded in our capacity to discern whether or not a proposition is rationally coherent.
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Archival date: 2018-10-30
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2018-10-30

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