Carnap Sentences and the Newman Problem

Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):23-30 (2015)
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Abstract

In this paper I discuss the Newman problem in the context of contemporary epistemic structural realism (ESR). I formulate Newman’s objection in terms that apply to today’s ESR and then evaluate a defence of ESR based on Carnap’s use of Ramsey sentences and Hilbert’s ε-operator. I show that this defence improves the situation by allowing a formal stipulation of non-structural constraints. However, it fails short of achieving object individuation in the context of satisfying the Ramsified form of a theory. Thus, while limiting the scope of Newman’s argument, Carnap sentences do not fully solve the problem.

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Larisa I. Gogianu
University of Bucharest

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