Expressivism and realist explanations

Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1385-1409 (2017)
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Abstract
It is often claimed that there is an explanatory divide between an expressivist account of normative discourse and a realist conception of normativity: more precisely, that expressivism and realism offer conflicting explanations of (i) the metaphysical structure of the normative realm, (ii) the connection between normative judgment and motivation, (iii) our normative beliefs and any convergence thereof, or (iv) the content of normative thoughts and claims. In this paper I argue that there need be no such explanatory conflict. Given a minimalist approach to the relevant metaphysical and semantic notions, expressivism is compatible with any explanation that would be acceptable as a general criterion for realism.
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First archival date: 2017-10-17
Latest version: 2 (2017-10-17)
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References found in this work BETA
The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.

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Relativism and the Expressivist Bifurcation.Salas, Javier González de Prado

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2016-08-20

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