Epistemic Modal Credence
Philosophers' Imprint 21 (26) (2021)
Abstract
Triviality results threaten plausible principles governing our credence in epistemic modal claims. This paper develops a new account of modal credence which avoids triviality. On the resulting theory, probabilities are assigned not to sets of worlds, but rather to sets of information state-world pairs. The theory avoids triviality by giving up the principle that rational credence is closed under conditionalization. A rational agent can become irrational by conditionalizing on new evidence. In place of conditionalization, the paper develops a new account of updating: conditionalization with normalization.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GOLEMC
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-02-04
View other versions
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-02-04
Total views
559 ( #12,635 of 69,002 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
45 ( #18,217 of 69,002 )
2020-02-04
Total views
559 ( #12,635 of 69,002 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
45 ( #18,217 of 69,002 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.