Epistemic Modal Credence

Philosophers' Imprint (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Triviality results threaten plausible principles governing our credence in epistemic modal claims. This paper develops a new account of modal credence which avoids triviality. On the resulting theory, probabilities are assigned not to sets of worlds, but rather to sets of information state-world pairs. The theory avoids triviality by giving up the principle that rational credence is closed under conditionalization. A rational agent can become irrational by conditionalizing on new evidence. In place of conditionalization, the paper develops a new account of updating: conditionalization with normalization.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GOLEMC
Revision history
Archival date: 2020-02-04
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2020-02-04

Total views
227 ( #19,343 of 50,089 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
227 ( #1,686 of 50,089 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.