Quasi-naturalism and the Problem of Alternative Normative Concepts

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The following scenario seems possible: a community uses concepts that play the same role in guiding actions and shaping social life as our normative concepts, and yet refer to something else. As Eklund (2017) argues, this apparent possibility poses a problem for any normative realist who aspires to vindicate the thought that reality itself favors our ways of valuing and acting. A promising approach to this challenge is to try to rule out the possibility of alternative normative concepts, by arguing that any concepts that have the same normative role must share a reference as well. (Eklund calls this "referential normativity".) In this paper I argue that normative quasi-naturalism, a view that combines expressivism about normative discourse with a naturalist metaphysics of normativity, supports referential normativity and solves the problem of alternative normative concepts.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2021-09-08
Latest version: 2 (2021-09-08)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
26 ( #60,016 of 2,444,936 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #26,968 of 2,444,936 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.