Towards a New Account of Progress in Metaphysics: The Tool Building Approach

Abstract

In this paper, I lay the groundwork for a new account of progress in metaphysics, the ‘tool building approach’. The account is born out of a response to the problem of theory-change for naturalistic metaphysics. Kerry McKenzie (2020) makes clear the problem of theory-change for naturalistic metaphysics. She argues that naturalistic metaphysical theories cannot make progress on the back of scientific theories because metaphysical theories cannot be approximately true. First, I apply a well-known account of scientific progress, the truthlikeness account of progress, to theories in metaphysics in order to show that metaphysics can make progress on such an account. This account, however, will not fully address the issue of radically changing theories over theory-change. Then, I offer a new account of progress in metaphysics, the tool building approach, that specifies the progress metaphysics makes even if our best naturalistic theories in metaphysics radically change.

Author's Profile

Dylan Goldman
University of California, Davis

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2024-02-10

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