Does “possible” ever mean “logically possible”?

Philosophia 8 (2-3):389-403 (1978)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Are skeptical arguments invalid because they trade on an ambiguity of the word "possible," asserting that it is possible that our experiences are not of anything outside our own minds and concluding that it is not certain that there is an external world outside our own minds? It is sometimes asserted that such arguments invalidly trade on an ambiguity of "possible" where the premise is true only in the sense "logically possible" while the inference is valid only in the sense "empirically possible." However, once we distinguish different grammatical complements of the phrase "it is possible" we recognize that, when used with the same complement, "possible" is not ambiguous. So the claim that skeptical arguments trade on an ambiguity of "possible" fails.

Author's Profile

Paul Gomberg
University of California, Davis

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
363 (#56,472)

6 months
104 (#60,080)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?