What should we retain from a plain person's concept of free will?

Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):40-43 (2005)
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Abstract
Hodgson’s (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12 (1), 2005) defense of the plain person’s view that free will exists in conscious voluntary action is discussed. His position against the view that human action is automatically determined is favored, but his view that free will is incompatible with natural causation is countered. Eccles’ hypothesis to account for the presence of a readiness potential prior to a conscious decision to act now is discussed. It is argued that it is possible to preserve what is good in a plain person’s concept of free will in a way that is compatible with natural causation.
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First archival date: 2013-03-25
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