Máquinas sin engranajes y cuerpos sin mentes. ¿cuán dualista es el funcionalismo de máquina de Turing?

Revista de Filosofía 67:183-200 (2011)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
En este trabajo examino cómo el Funcionalismo de Máquina de Turing resulta compatible con una forma de dualismo, lo que aleja a la IA clásica o fuerte del materialismo que la inspiró originalmente en el siglo XIX. Para sostener esta tesis, argumento que efectivamente existe una notable cercanía entre el pensamiento cartesiano y dicho funcionalismo, ya que el primero afirma que es concebible/posible separar mente y cuerpo, mientras que el segundo sostiene que no es estrictamente necesario que los estados mentales se realicen en las propiedades físicas de engranajes y máquinas reales. This article deals with how Turing Machine Functionalism turns out to be compatible with a form of Dualism, which involves that strong AI is not close to the original Materialism that inspired it in the nineteenth century. To support this thesis, I argue that there is a compelling coincidence between Descartes' philosophy and this version of Functionalism, since the former holds that it is conceivable/possible to separate mind and body, while the latter holds that it is not strictly necessary that mental states are realized by the physical properties of real cogs and machines.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GONMSE-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-05-04
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-02-20

Total views
242 ( #20,724 of 54,517 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #30,854 of 54,517 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.