A defense of creationism in fiction

Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):131-155 (2004)
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Abstract
Creationism is the conjunction of the following theses: (i) fictional individuals (e.g. Sherlock Holmes) actually exist; (ii) fictional names (e.g., 'Holmes') are at least sometimes genuinely referential; (iii) fictional individuals are the creations of the authors who first wrote (or spoke, etc.) about them. CA Creationism is the conjunction of (i) - (iii) and the following thesis: (iv) fictional individuals are contingently existing abstracta; they are non-concrete artifacts of our world and various other possible worlds. TakashiYagisawa has recently provided a number of arguments designed to show that Creationism is unjustified. I here critically examine three of his challenges to CA Creationism. I argue that each fails to undermine this version of Creationism.
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Archival date: 2018-12-11
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.
Nonexistence.Salmon, Nathan
Truth in Fiction.Lewis, David K.

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2009-01-28

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