Fundamentality, Existence, Totality: On Three Notions of Reality and the Landscape of Metaphysics

In Yannic Kappes, Asya Passinsky, Julio De Rizzo & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Facets of Reality — Contemporary Debates. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft / Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Band / Vol. XXX. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 292-300 (2024)
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Abstract

Metaphysics is, historically as well as systematically, mostly taken to be the inquiry into reality, insofar it is considered to be: (1) the totality of everything there is; (2) of everything that exists; or (3) what is fundamental. This paper sets out to analyze the relation between all three metaphysical core notions and sketch the landscape of metaphysical theories that emerges from it. Taking The Fundamental, The Existent, and Totality to be the domains corresponding to each metaphysical object of inquiry, it is argued that they stand in the settheoretical relations of: The Fundamental ⊆ The Existent ⊆ Totality. This general structure allows for a plurality of more detailed structures when we differentiate between the ones that treat at least two notions as extensionally equal and those that take them to be proper subsets. Furthermore, reductive and inflationary strategies between equating two of the notions will be differentiated, allowing for a detailed sketch of the landscape of metaphysical theories and their views on the nature of reality. In closing, it is argued that the metaphysical structure allowing for most differentiation in metaphysical status is to be preferred as it allows to adequately capture metaphysical disputes, constituting evidence for the importance of each metaphysical notion and a short plea against their conflation.

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Dustin Gooßens
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

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