Social Theory and Practice 46 (2):277-297 (2020)
AbstractMuch of the literature on impairment to self-governance focuses on cases in which a person either lacks the ability to protect herself from errant urges or cases in which a person lacks the capacity to initiate self-reflective agential processes. This has led to frameworks for thinking about self-governance designed with only the possibility of these sorts of impairments in mind. I challenge this orthodoxy using the case of melancholic depression to show that there is a third way that self-governance can be undermined: an agent may fail to form the desire she most wants to act on.
Archival historyFirst archival date: 2019-12-18
Latest version: 3 (2019-12-19)
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