Talking about intentional objects

Dialectica 60 (2):135-144 (2006)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Discusses the old problem of how to characterize apparently intentional states that appear to lack objects. In tandem with critically discussing a recent proposal by Tim Crane, I develop the line of reasoning according to which talking about intentional objects is really a way of talking about intentional states—in particular, it’s a way of talking about their satisfaction-conditions.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GORTAI
Revision history
Archival date: 2013-10-28
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Fiction and Metaphysics.Thomasson, Amie L.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
445 ( #9,511 of 50,123 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
52 ( #11,219 of 50,123 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.