The Minimal Approval View of Attributional-Responsibility

Dissertation, University of Southern California (2018)
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Abstract

I argue in favor of the Minimal Approval account, an original account of an agent’s moral responsibility for her actions, understood as the conditions that must be met so that an agent’s actions speak for her such that she can appropriately be blamed on their basis. My account shares a general theoretical orientation with Deep Self views, but diverges in several respects. I argue that Deep Self views tend to seriously over-generate exemptions, such that agents are exempt from responsibility even from ordinary weak-willed actions. Accordingly, much of my focus is on giving a more nuanced, and in certain senses narrower, explanation of genuine exemption cases. While I address the advantages the Minimal Approval account has over competing accounts throughout these chapters, the account also aims to provide an empirically informed response to a certain sort of skeptical worry about how it could be the case that anyone is ever responsible for what they do at all. One commonplace thought is that when agents’ behaviors are due to compulsion their “brains make them do it.” But, in a literal sense, it might seem that our brains make all of us do everything that we do. In this dissertation I head off this worry by directly addressing both what the difference is, and what it should mean for our practices.

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August Gorman
Oakland University

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