Williams and the Desirability of Body‐Bound Immortality Revisited

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Bernard Williams argues that human mortality is a good thing because living forever would necessarily be intolerably boring. His argument is often attacked for unfoundedly proposing asymmetrical requirements on the desirability of living for mortal and immortal lives. My first aim in this paper is to advance a new interpretation of Williams' argument that avoids these objections, drawing in part on some of his other writings to contextualize it. My second aim is to show how even the best version of his argument only supports a somewhat weaker thesis: it may be possible for some people with certain special psychological features to enjoy an immortal life, but no one has good reason to bet on being such a person.
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Archival date: 2017-07-17
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Immortality and Boredom.Fischer, John Martin & Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin
Immortal Curiosity.Tanyi, Attila & Karlander, Karl

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