Functional role semantics and reflective equilibrium

Acta Analytica 21 (38):62-76 (2006)
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Abstract
In this paper it is argued that functional role semantics can be saved from criticisms, such as those raised by Putnam and Fodor and Lepore, by indicating which beliefs and inferences are more constitutive in determining mental content. The Scylla is not to use vague expressions; the Charybdis is not to endorse the analytic/synthetic distinction. The core idea is to use reflective equilibrium as a strategy to pinpoint which are the beliefs and the inferences that constitute the content of a mental state. The beliefs and the inferences that are constitutive are those that are in reflective equilibrium in the process of attributing mental states to others
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Archival date: 2013-05-22
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Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?Premack, David & Woodruff, G.

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