Necessitarianism and Dispositions

Metaphysica (1):1-23 (2020)
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Abstract
In this paper, I argue in favor of necessitarianism, the view that dispositions, when stimulated, necessitate their manifestations. After introducing and clarifying what necessitarianism does and does not amount to, I provide reasons to support the view that dispositions once stimulated necessitate their manifestations according to the stimulating conditions and the relevant properties at stake. In this framework, I will propose a principle of causal relevance and some conditions for the possibility of interference that allow us to avoid the use of ceteris paribus clauses. I then defend necessitarianism from recent attacks raised by, among others, Mumford and Anjum, noting that the antecedent strengthening test is a test for causal relevance that raises no difficulties for necessitarianism.
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2020
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GOZNAD
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First archival date: 2020-01-07
Latest version: 2 (2020-01-17)
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References found in this work BETA
Getting Causes From Powers.Mumford, Stephen & Anjum, Rani Lill

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Citations of this work BETA
Causal Necessitation and Dispositional Modality.Ioannidis, Stavros; Livanios, Vassilis & Psillos, Stathis

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2020-01-07

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