Rationality, folk psychology, and the belief-opinion distinction

Acta Analytica 12:113-123 (1997)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of the distinction between belief and opinion in the light of Dennett's intentional stance. In particular, I consider whether the distinction could be used for a defence of the stance from various criticisms. I will then apply the distinction to the so-called `paradoxes of irrationality'. In this context I will propose that we should avoid the postulation of `boundaries' or `gaps' within the mind, and will attempt to show that a useful treatment of the paradoxes can be obtained by revising the rationality assumption

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Simone Gozzano
Università degli Studi dell'Aquila

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