Reconsidering the Logic of Emotion

Philosophia 41 (3):787-794 (2013)
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It is customarily assumed that propositional attitudes present two independent components: a propositional component and a psychological component, in the form of an attitudes. These two components are caught by means of two different methods: propositions by some model theoretic theory, psychological attitudes by making appeal to their functional or psychological role. Some authors have seek a convergence by individuating propositions by some Functional role semantics. In this paper I show that when it comes to emotional attitudes with propositional content, either the independence of proposition and attitude collapses or functional role semantics brings to unstable individuation conditions for propositions. Some consequences of these two outcomes are considered
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Intentionality.Searle, John
Holism: A Shopper's Guide.Fodor, Jerry A. & Lepore, Ernest

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