Type-identity conditions for phenomenal properties

In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspective on Type Identity. The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. pp. 111-126 (2012)
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Abstract
In this essay I shall argue that the crucial assumptions of Kripke's argument, i.e. the collapse of the appearance/reality distinction in the case of phenomenal states and the idea of a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, imply an objective principle of identity for mental-state types. This principle, I shall argue, rather than being at odds with physicalism, is actually compatible with both the type-identity theory of the mind and Kripke's semantics and metaphysics. Finally, I shall sketch a version of the type-identity theory.
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Archival date: 2013-05-22
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2012-10-05

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