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Counterexamples to Testimonial Transmission
In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 61-77 (2019)
Abstract
Commonsense holds that testimony transfers knowledge from a speaker to the hearer. If the speaker has knowledge, then the hearer acquires it. Call that sufficiency. And a hearer acquires knowledge only if the speaker has it to transfer. Call that necessity. This article reviews counterexamples--and some replies to those counterexamples--to both claims.Author Profiles
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2019-10-14
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432 (#49,222)
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137 (#39,737)
2019-10-14
Downloads
432 (#49,222)
6 months
137 (#39,737)
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