Eksperymenty myślowe w służbie esencjalizmu

Filozofia Nauki 17 (1):23 (2009)
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Abstract

Thought experiments are often employed by philosophers who try to differentiate between essential and accidental properties. These experiments are said to stimulate the intuition of the reader (be it eidetic, linguistic or any other type of intuition). But sometimes they rather persuade the reader than test his intuition. How can we test the readers without revealing to them the role of test subjects they play? I suggest that some works of fiction can be treated as massive thought experiments because they are very similar to the stories philosophers use. The trouble is, that in the case of fiction our intuition is much more liberal and we accept things we would have certainly called impossible had they been presented to us in a philosophical article. I use some examples to show that our notion of impossibility depends on our naive, commonsense preconceptions of what objects and technologies exist in the world we are talking about. But this is exactly the type of knowledge philosophers ask us to suspend when they present their thought experiments

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Pawel Grabarczyk
University of Lodz

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