On The Content and Character of Pain Experience

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):47-68 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Tracking representationalism explains the negative affective character of pain, and its capacity to motivate action, by reference to the representation of the badness for us of bodily damage. I argue that there is a more fitting instantiation of the tracking relation – the badness for us of extremely intense stimuli – and use this to motivate a non-reductive approach to the negative affective character of pain. The view of pain proposed here is supported by consideration of three related topics: the pain caused when the body is damaged, reparative pain, and the messenger-shooting objection to tracking representationalism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GRAOTC-12
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-02-17
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-11-15

Total views
153 ( #35,964 of 2,448,870 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #28,170 of 2,448,870 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.