On The Content and Character of Pain Experience

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):47-68 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Tracking representationalism explains the negative affective character of pain, and its capacity to motivate action, by reference to the representation of the badness for us of bodily damage. I argue that there is a more fitting instantiation of the tracking relation – the badness for us of extremely intense stimuli – and use this to motivate a non-reductive approach to the negative affective character of pain. The view of pain proposed here is supported by consideration of three related topics: the pain caused when the body is damaged, reparative pain, and the messenger-shooting objection to tracking representationalism.

Author's Profile

Richard Gray
Cardiff University

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-11-15

Downloads
452 (#39,630)

6 months
105 (#43,878)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?