Plantinga Redux: Is the Scientific Realist Committed to the Rejection of Naturalism?

Sophia 59 (3):395-412 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

While Plantinga has famously argued that acceptance of neo-Darwinian theory commits one to the rejection of naturalism, Plantinga’s argument is vulnerable to an objection developed by Evan Fales. Not only does Fales’ objection undermine Plantinga’s original argument, it establishes a general challenge which any attempt to revitalize Plantinga’s argument must overcome. After briefly laying out the contours of this challenge, we attempt to meet it by arguing that because a purely naturalistic account of our etiology cannot explain the correlation between our preference for simplicity and simplicity’s ability to serve as a veridical method of theory selection, the scientific realist is committed to the rejection of naturalism.

Author Profiles

Abraham D. Graber Graber
Western Illinois University
Luke Golemon
University of Arizona

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-01-21

Downloads
190 (#73,459)

6 months
111 (#37,908)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?