Relational approaches to Frege's puzzle

Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12429 (2017)
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Abstract
Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representational relations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism—semantic relationism and formal relationism—corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I briefly discuss the consequences of relational approaches for foundational questions about propositional attitudes, intentional explanation, and compositionality.
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Archival date: 2017-10-09
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A Puzzle About Belief.Kripke, Saul A.
Words.Kaplan, David

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