Relational approaches to Frege's puzzle

Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12429 (2017)
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Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representational relations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism—semantic relationism and formal relationism—corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I briefly discuss the consequences of relational approaches for foundational questions about propositional attitudes, intentional explanation, and compositionality.
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References found in this work BETA
The Varieties of Reference.Antony, Louise M.; Evans, Gareth & McDowell, John
A Puzzle About Belief.Kripke, Saul A.
Solving Frege's Puzzle.Heck Jr, Richard G.

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