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Mind 126 (501):93-121 (2017)
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Abstract
While recent discussions of contextualism have mostly focused on other issues, some influential early statements of the view emphasized the possibility of its providing an alternative to both coherentism and traditional versions of foundationalism. In this essay, I will pick up on this strand of contextualist thought, and argue that contextualist versions of foundationalism promise to solve some problems that their non-contextualist cousins cannot. In particular, I will argue that adopting contextualist versions of foundationalism can let us reconcile Bayesian accounts of belief updating with a version of the holist claim that all beliefs are defeasible.
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Archival date: 2015-07-25
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2015-07-25

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