How Verbal Reports of Desire May Mislead

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):241-249 (2017)
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In this paper I highlight two noteworthy features of assertions about our desires, and then highlight two ways in which they can mislead us into drawing unwarranted conclusions about desire. Some of our assertions may indicate that we are sometimes motivated independently of desire, and other assertions may suggest that there are vast divergences between our normative judgements and our desires. But I suggest that some such assertions are, in this respect, potentially misleading, and have in fact misled authors such as Russ Shafer-Landau, Jack Woods, and Tim Scanlon.
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