Moral uncertainty about population ethics

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Given the deep disagreement surrounding population axiology, one should remain uncertain about which theory is best. However, this uncertainty need not leave one neutral about which acts are better or worse. We show that as the number of lives at stake grows, the Expected Moral Value approach to axiological uncertainty systematically pushes one towards choosing the option preferred by the Total and Critical Level views, even if one’s credence in those theories is low.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-07-08
View other versions
Added to PP

843 (#7,814)

6 months
81 (#8,853)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?