Moral uncertainty about population ethics

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Given the deep disagreement surrounding population axiology, one should remain uncertain about which theory is best. However, this uncertainty need not leave one neutral about which acts are better or worse. We show that as the number of lives at stake grows, the Expected Moral Value approach to axiological uncertainty systematically pushes one towards choosing the option preferred by the Total and Critical Level views, even if one’s credence in those theories is low.

Author Profiles

Toby Ord
University of Oxford
Hilary Greaves
Oxford University

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