Putting the bite back into 'Two Dogmas'

Principia 7 (1-2):115-129 (2003)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Recent Carnap scholarship suggests that the received view of the Carnap-Quine analyticity debate is importantly mistaken. It has been suggested that Carnap’s analyticity distinction is immune from Quine’s criticisms. This is either because Quine did not understand Carnap’s use of analytic-ity, or because Quine did not appreciate that, rather than dispelling dog-mas, he was merely offering an alternate framework for philosophy. It has also been suggested that ultimately nothing of substance turns on this dis-pute. I am sympathetic to these reassessments and their rejection of the re-ceived view, but argue that they fail to pay proper attention to Carnap’s metaphysical deflationism. For it is there that Quine’s arguments ultimately make contact with Carnap, undermining his metaphysical deflationism. Moreover, the viability of deflationism is directly related to the viability of Carnap’s view of philosophy as methodologically distinct from science. Hence, Quine’s criticisms make contact with the deepest aspects of Carnap’s views
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GREPTB
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-09-24
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Reconsidering Logical Positivism.Friedman, Michael & Richardson, Alan W.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
154 ( #18,907 of 40,654 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #19,173 of 40,654 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.