Safety, Explanation, Iteration

Philosophical Issues 26 (1):187-208 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper argues for several related theses. First, the epistemological position that knowledge requires safe belief can be motivated by views in the philosophy of science, according to which good explanations show that their explananda are robust. This motivation goes via the idea—recently defended on both conceptual and empirical grounds—that knowledge attributions play a crucial role in explaining successful action. Second, motivating the safety requirement in this way creates a choice point—depending on how we understand robustness, we'll end up with different conceptions of safety in epistemology. Lastly, and most controversially, there's an attractive choice at this point that will not vindicate some of the most influential applications of the safety-theoretic framework in epistemology, e.g., Williamson's arguments against the KK principle, and luminosity.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GRESEI-4
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-09-19
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Unreasonable Knowledge.Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Modal Virtue Epistemology.Beddor, Bob & Pavese, Carlotta

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-09-19

Total downloads
104 ( #20,642 of 37,120 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #14,532 of 37,120 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.