Transmitting Faith

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Part One of the paper argues against evidentialism and individualism in religious epistemology, and in favor of a “social turn” in the field. The idea here is that human belief in general, and religious belief in particular, is largely characterized by epistemic dependence on other persons. An adequate epistemology, it is agued, ought to recognize and account for social epistemic dependence. Part Two considers a problem that becomes salient when we make such a turn. In short, how are we to understand the transmission of knowledge and rational faith in a religious tradition? The problem arises because, by all accounts, even the best traditions transmit superstitions, self-serving prejudices, and other things that are down right false on any reasonable view. So how is it that these same traditions can also transmit rational faith and even knowledge by means of the very same channels, for example channels of religious authority and religious teaching? Part Three offers a tentative solution to this problem.
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Archival date: 2019-04-11
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