Aristotle's Teleological Luck

Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Theologie 63 (2):441-457 (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper I discuss some problems with Aristotle’s characterization of lucky events as events which are “for the sake of something”. I argue that there is no special sense of the phrase “for the sake of something” when applied to lucky events. Qua event, a lucky event has come about for the sake of something and thus unqualifiedly belongs among things that come about for the sake of something. But qua lucky event, it has not come about for the sake of that thing it has come about qua event, but it nevertheless is, or turns out to be, for the sake of something.

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Filip Grgic
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb

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