Against Direct Realism (near final draft)

Philosophy Now 146 (October/November):12-13 (2021)
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Abstract

Up until the middle years of the twentieth century, the vast majority of philosophers rejected theories of direct perception, but by its close direct realism had become the new orthodoxy. On the other hand, mainstream cognitive science has been consistent in its rejection of direct perception. And, moreover, when direct perception is championed by an avowedly radical Gibsonian minority it is at the expense of questioning the realist assumptions that underpin contemporary analytic philosophy. So here is a dilemma for direct realism: it seems you can have the directness-claim or the realism-claim, but not both together.

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