The being that knew too much

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (3):141-154 (2000)
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Abstract

John Abbruzzese has recently attempted a defense of omniscience against a series of my attacks. This affords me a welcome occasion to clarify some of the arguments, to pursue some neglected subtleties, and to re-think some important complications. In the end, however, I must insist that at least three of four crucial arguments really do show an omniscient being to be impossible. Abbruzzese sometimes misunderstands the forms of the argument themselves, and quite generally misunderstands their force.

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Patrick Grim
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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