Is there an empirical case for semantic perception?

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (10):3770-3795 (2024)
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Abstract

I argue that results in perception science do not support the claim that there is semantic perception or that typical, unreflective utterance comprehension is a perceptual process. Phenomena discussed include evidence-insensitivity, the Stroop effect, pop-out, and adaptation – as well as how these phenomena might relate to the function, format, and structure of perceptual representations. An emphasis is placed on non-inferential transitions from perceptual to conceptual representations, which are important for debates about the admissible contents of perception more generally.

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Steven Gross
Johns Hopkins University

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