Perception and the Origins of Temporal Representation

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):275-292 (2017)
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Is temporal representation constitutively necessary for perception? Tyler Burge (2010) argues that it is, in part because perception requires a form of memory sufficiently sophisticated as to require temporal representation. I critically discuss Burge’s argument, maintaining that it does not succeed. I conclude by reflecting on the consequences for the origins of temporal representation.
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Intentionality.Searle, John R.
Making It Explicit.Levi, Isaac & Brandom, Robert B.
Biosemantics.Millikan, Ruth G.

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