Paternalism, Respect and the Will

Ethics 122 (4):692-720 (2012)
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Abstract

In general, we think that when it comes to the good of another, we respect that person’s will by acting in accordance with what he wills because he wills it. I argue that this is not necessarily true. When it comes to the good of another person, it is possible to disrespect that person’s will while acting in accordance with what he wills because he wills it. Seeing how this is so, I argue, enables us to clarify the distinct roles that the wills of competent and incompetent people should play in third-party deliberations about their welfare.

Author's Profile

Daniel Groll
Carleton College

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